The Doctrine of Charitable Immunity and Its Impact on Medical Malpractice Litigation in the United States by Grassman, John
JCCC Honors Journal
Volume 5
Issue 2 Spring 2014 Article 2
2014
The Doctrine of Charitable Immunity and Its
Impact on Medical Malpractice Litigation in the
United States
John Grassman
Johnson County Community College, jgrassma@stumail.jccc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarspace.jccc.edu/honors_journal
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at ScholarSpace @ JCCC. It has been accepted for inclusion in JCCC
Honors Journal by an authorized administrator of ScholarSpace @ JCCC. For more information, please contact bbaile14@jccc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Grassman, John (2014) "The Doctrine of Charitable Immunity and Its Impact on Medical Malpractice Litigation in the United States,"
JCCC Honors Journal: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarspace.jccc.edu/honors_journal/vol5/iss2/2
The Doctrine of Charitable Immunity and Its Impact on Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the United States
Abstract
This paper examines the powerful and long lasting influence in the United States of the doctrine of charitable
immunity which exempted charitable organizations from civil litigation as the result of the negligent acts of its
agents. Having exempted hospitals from liability, the courts subsequently applied respondeat superior to staff
working under the direction of physicians The paper further examines the targeting of physicians as "deep
pockets" through the creation of a number of legal fictions which include the captain of the ship and vicarious
liability. The repudiation of the doctrine of charitable immunity and ascension of the doctrine of corporate
liability shifted the deep pockets target of malpractice litigation from physicians to hospitals. Disclosure of
adverse events is examined and settlement of malpractice suits out of court is discussed. The paper concludes
with a discussion of disclosure of adverse events and expresses hope for the future of the end of the adversarial
nature of resolution with the advent of programs such as Disclosure, Apology, and Offer (DA&O).
Keywords
charitable immunity, deep pockets, captain of the ship, medical malpractice, malpractice crisis, respondeat
superior, disclosure, Schloendorff rule, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Disclosure Apology and Offer (DA&O),
vicarious liability, doctrine of corporate liability.
Cover Page Footnote
Norma Fordham, J.D., served as JCCC Faculty adviser for this paper.
This article is available in JCCC Honors Journal: http://scholarspace.jccc.edu/honors_journal/vol5/iss2/2
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author would like to offer sincerest thanks to Bonnie S. Johnson, RN, JD, Director of 
Risk Management for the Saint Luke's Health System for sharing her insights into the 
workings of the medical malpractice system as well as her wise counsel and contributions 
to the ethics of risk management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
Grassman: Doctrine of Charitable Immunity
Published by ScholarSpace @ JCCC, 2014
 INTRODUCTION 
If a physician make a large incision with the operating knife, and kill 
him, or open a tumor with the operating knife, and cut out the eye, his 
hands shall be cut off. 
 
Code of Hammurabi, number 218
1
 
 
 
As illustrated by this excerpt from the Code of the Great Lawgiver Hammurabi, 
tension between physicians and patients has existed since the dawn of recorded history. 
Medical malpractice litigation has often been characterized as a result of the schism 
between upper and lower socioeconomic classes.
2,3
 Medical malpractice litigation in 
England is documented as early as 1374.
4
 The current malpractice "crisis" is not the first 
of its kind in this country.
5
 However, there has been a shift in the target of malpractice 
litigation from the physician to the hospital.
6
  
Prior to the 1960s, hospitals were largely protected from malpractice litigation or 
"tort liability" by the doctrine of charitable immunity.
7
 That is, there was a legal 
prohibition from successfully bringing suit against a charitable organization for the 
actions of its agents even if those actions were negligent.
 
The judicial rejection of 
charitable immunity has shifted the prime target of medical malpractice litigation from 
the physician to the hospital as the "'deepest pocket,'"
8
 a turn of events that will be the 
focus of this paper.  
The first part of the paper will look at the origin of charitable immunity in Great 
Britain and then its subsequent adoption in the United States. The second part of the 
paper will examine the foundations of medical malpractice litigation in Britain and the 
state of malpractice litigation in early America. Next, the case of Charles Lowell and the 
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 impact of that case on malpractice litigation in the nineteenth century will be discussed.  
The paper will then focus back on the rise and fall charitable immunity, the captain of the 
ship doctrine, respondeat superior  and the "deep pockets" concept.  
Finally the paper will briefly look at the current state of malpractice litigation and 
concludes with hope for the future in the revolutionary concept of full disclosure 
regarding medical errors. 
THE ORIGIN OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY 
British Common Law 
Our American legal system, derived, as it is, from the traditions of British 
common law, is nonetheless a unique creation. Despite our common language, much is 
altered, if not completely lost in the transition or translation. The proverb, "There's many 
a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip" seems particularly appropriate in the context of the 
subject of charitable immunity.  
A dictum of Lord Cottenham in British court in the case of Feoffees of Heriot's 
Hospital v. Ross (1846) stated: "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to 
apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert 
it to a completely different purpose."
9
 Lord Cottenham had previously pronounced 
essentially the same dictum in the case of Duncan v. Findlater (1839). Then, in the case 
of Holliday v. St. Leonard's (1861), the British court cited the dictum from Duncan as its 
authority.
10
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 In 1866, however, the British Courts overruled Lord Cottenham's dictum in 
Duncan. Then, in 1871, the Holliday case which had cited Duncan was overturned.
11
 As 
a consequence of these reversals, the doctrine of charitable immunity "soon disappeared 
from English law."
12
  The irony is this: not only was charitable immunity repudiated 
before crossing the Atlantic Ocean, it was, as interpreted here in the United States, a 
"misapplication of previously established principles . . . ."
13
 
Welcome to America 
It is unlikely that the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1876 deciding the case of 
McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital knew that Holliday had been overturned five years 
previously. The court cited Holliday nonetheless, and came to this conclusion: 
[I]f there has been no neglect on the part of those who 
administer the trust and control its management, and if due 
care has been used by them in the selection of their inferior 
agents, even if injury has occurred by the negligence of 
such agents, it cannot be made responsible. The funds 
intrusted [sic] to it are not to be diminished by such 
casualties, if those immediately controlling them have done 
their whole duty in reference to those who have sought to 
obtain the benefit of them.
14
 
 
With those words, the doctrine of charitable immunity, dead in its homeland, rose, 
phoenix like, in the US where it had a major effect on health care and malpractice 
litigation for over one hundred years. Yet, in  the case on which the doctrine was based, 
"[t]he action was for damages for wrongful exclusion from the benefits of the charity, not 
for personal injury. . . ."
15 
The particulars of the doctrine or "rule" of charitable immunity varied from state 
to state since it first appeared in the United States in 1876.  Broadly, where adopted, the 
4
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 rule prohibited lawsuits against charitable organizations for the tortious or negligent 
conduct of their employees. The definition of what a charitable organization was was not 
as narrowly defined as what are commonly acknowledged to be charities, such as the 
Salvation Army. Also included in the definition were such not-for-profit groups such as 
"hospitals, churches, schools and colleges, and YMCAs."
16
  
Nor was charitable immunity accepted universally; the 1879 case of Glavin v. 
Rhode Island Hospital rejected McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, stating, in part: 
"[W]here there is duty, there there [sic] is, primâ facie at least, liability for its neglect . . . 
."
17  
The court also noted several cases in which Holliday had "been qualified or 
impugned."
18
  Furthermore, "[t]he authority of McDonald v. The Massachusetts General 
Hospital, in so far as it rests upon Holliday v. St. Leonard, is seriously impaired by these 
cases. . . ."
19
  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
British foundations 
 The first known litigation in England regarding what would eventually become 
known as medical malpractice was in 1374. Suit was brought on behalf of Agnes of 
Stratton against London surgeon John Swanlond for breach of contract. Agnes' hand had 
been mangled in an accident and, after healing, remained terribly deformed. She claimed 
he had guaranteed, for "reasonable payment",
20
 to effect a cure on her hand.
21, 22
  
Ruling for the Court of the King's Bench in Stratton v. Swanlond, Chief Justice 
John Cavendish found error in the writ of complaint and the surgeon "escaped liability."
23
 
However, in his holdings Justice Cavendish elucidated the basic tenets of medical 
5
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 malpractice and they passed into common law: if, through the negligent acts of the 
physician a patient should suffer harm, the physician should be held liable. However, a 
bad outcome would not open the physician to liability if he "diligently applied himself."
24
 
Our modern day concept of the "'ordinary reasonable/prudent physician'"
25
 can be traced 
directly from Cavendish's holdings in this case.  
 Although the concept had become part of the common law with Stratton and 
Justice Cavendish, the term "malpractice" did not come into being until the mid 
eighteenth century with William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765-69).   
4. Injuries, affecting a man's health are where, by any 
unwholesome practices of another, a man sustains any 
apparent damage in his vigor or constitution. As . . . or by 
the neglect or unskillful management of his physician, 
surgeon or apothecary. For it hath been solemnly resolved, 
that mala praxis [bad practice] is a great misdemeanor and 
offence at common law, whether it be for curiosity and 
experiment,  or by neglect; because it breaks the trust 
which the party has placed in his physician and tends to the 
patient's destruction. 
26 
 
Early American malpractice litigation  
 A surgical death in Connecticut in 1794 is the first known suit for malpractice in 
this country.
27,28
 Three hours after having a mastectomy by a physician named Cross, 
Mrs. Guthrie died. Her husband sued for negligence, prevailed with the jury verdict and 
was awarded £40.
29
  
Despite this bump in the road, the years 1790 to 1830 were a quiet time in the 
history of malpractice litigation, so quiet, that it has been noted that few American 
lawyers would have had the knowledge to properly draft a complaint.
30
 Even as the first 
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 great outbreak of  medical malpractice litigation loomed on the horizon, medical 
educators such as Nathan Smith of Yale and R.E. Griffith of the University of 
Pennsylvania believed that medical litigation could be a positive force, helping to ensure 
that deficient medical care would not go unredressed. Litigation could help improve 
medical care by being vigilant where state and federal authorities were lax in monitoring 
substandard physician performance.
31
  
Unfortunately, medical malpractice litigation moved quickly from a virtually 
unknown phenomenon
32,33
 to an atmosphere that was perceived as being "the persecution 
of surgeons."
34 
And, like the case of  Stratton v. Swanlond, it was the treatment of 
orthopedic injury—and one orthopedic case in particular—that signaled the change. 
The case of Charles Lowell  
In September 1821, 27 year old Charles Lowell of Lubec, Maine suffered a 
dislocated left hip when he was thrown from a horse and the horse fell on him. Two 
physicians, Dr. Hawkes and Dr. Faxon worked on Lowell and, believing they had 
reduced the dislocation, wrapped the legs, did a phlebotomy, gave a sedative, and 
prescribed four weeks of bedrest. Lowell walked home one or two weeks after.  
When Hawkes saw Lowell a few weeks later, the leg was still deformed, and 
Hawkes informed the furious Lowell nothing more could be done. In December of 1821 
Lowell insisted upon treatment by Dr. Warren of Mass General Hospital despite Warren 
telling him nothing could be done. Out of compassion for Lowell's pleadings, Warren 
attempted unsuccessfully for two hours to reduce the dislocation. After discharge Lowell 
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 saw numerous other physicians and bone setters on his way home to Maine. None were 
able to help. 
Nine months after his initial injury, Lowell filed suit against Hawkes and Faxon, 
prevailed and was awarded $1962.00, the equivalent of $1.9 million in 2008. On appeal, 
the jury was hung. In June 1824 a third trial ended without an award to Lowell.
35
  
For the rest of his life, Lowell and his attorneys waged a very public war of words 
against the physicians who had attempted to help him, vilifying them unmercifully. In 
pamphlets, articles, and letters to newspapers he and his attorneys kept his animus for his 
physicians in the public eye. He called them  "assassins and quacks", accused Dr. Warren 
of  "ignorance of anatomy and surgery" and said the doctors were "ignorant quacks 
poisoning suffering humanity".
36
   
The impact of the Lowell case 
The publicity generated by this case contributed significantly to the boom in 
malpractice litigation.  In the period from 1830 to 1860, appellate malpractice decisions 
increased by 950%, and from 1860 to 1890 there was a 457% increase.
37
 And by the end 
of the nineteenth century, orthopedic injuries accounted for 90% of all medical 
malpractice cases.
38
  
Unfortunately, it was the most learned, best qualified physicians who bore the 
brunt of this boom time for malpractice litigation.
39
 Prior to 1830, the standard of care for 
compound fractures was amputation. As physicians began to attempt to save limbs, their 
failures or less than completely successful attempts came round to haunt them. When the 
standard of care was amputation, with the limb missing, how could the judgment of the 
8
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 physician be refuted?
40 
Amputation was standard practice. 
 
However, a poorly healed or 
deformed limb or hand—"crippled" in the parlance of the day—certainly would speak 
powerfully to a jury, easily engendering sympathy for the plaintiff. 
With technological advance comes heightened expectations of vastly improved 
outcomes. But attendant to those improved outcomes are unanticipated consequences, an 
ideal environment to foster malpractice litigation.
41
  
As medicine attempted to establish standards of care and education to weed out 
the uneducated and the quacks, its successes sometimes worked to its detriment. In the 
nineteenth century the AMA was formed and physicians were attempting to elevate the 
practice of medicine from a mere business transaction to a trust relationship based on the 
physician's specialized skills and knowledge. The ordinary contract model (alleging a 
breach of contract as in the Stratton v. Swanlond case) doesn't compliment this 
developing model well. Whereas the contract model is based on a promised outcome, the 
tort model assesses a process which does compliment the trust relationship model.
42
  
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY; OTHER LEGAL FICTIONS 
The rise of charitable immunity in the U.S. 
Charitable immunity generally found acceptance and was written into common 
law by seven high courts by 1900. Over half the states in the union had approved it by 
1920, and forty states had accepted it by 1938.
43
 The case of Jensen v. Maine Eye and 
Ear Infirmary (1910) is instructive. 
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 The Jensen case involved a woman who, while an "inmate" of Maine Eye and Ear 
Infirmary, managed to "evade the supervision of her attendants" and fell from a window 
five stories to the sidewalk. She died within a few hours of her fall. Her husband sued on 
the grounds of negligence of the staff of the institution. The defense contended (1) that 
the infirmary was "not a corporation for the treatment of sick and injured persons for 
hire" as alleged; and, (2) the infirmary was "a corporation organized and existing solely 
as a public charity" in conformity with chapter 519 of the Private and Special Laws of 
Maine (1897). The court found that since point two was valid, point one was irrelevant.
44
 
In its decision, the court affirms the basic rationale for charitable immunity that would 
stand more than thirty years longer virtually unchallenged. 
[A] purely charitable institution, supported by funds 
furnished by private and public charity, cannot be made 
liable in damages for the negligent acts of its servants. 
Were it not so, it is not difficult to discern that private gift 
and public aid would not long be contributed to feed the 
hungry maw of litigation, and charitable institutions of all 
kinds would ultimately cease or become greatly impaired in 
their usefulness.
45 
 
 And it was not just charitable institutions that were generally exempt from 
liability for the medical practice of physicians.
46
 In the case of Schloendorff v. Society of 
New York Hospital (1914) Justice Cardozo discussed the relationship between the 
hospital and the physician and held that the physician was essentially an "independent 
contractor". As such, the physician was "liable, of course, for his own wrongs to the 
patient whom he undertakes to serve, but involving the hospital in no liability, if due care 
has been taken in his selection."
47
 In what came to be known as "the Schloendorff rule"
48
 
it was decided that "the principle of respondeat superior was not to be applied to doctors 
10
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 and nurses . . . . even though employed by the hospital, they were to be regarded as 
independent contractors rather than employees. . . ."
49 
  
Charitable immunity comes under fire 
 A major shift in societal and judicial attitude was signaled by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia case Georgetown College v. Hughes 
(1942). Justice Rutledge gives an articulate and extremely well reasoned examination of 
charitable immunity, cases, and decisions, noting that dissents are "riotous" and that 
"[r]easons [for the dissents] are even more varied than results." Further, Rutledge 
maintained, a "law in flux" like this indicates a fundamental flaw in the law or a change 
that is trying to, but has not yet, self-corrected.
50
  
 Yet, in academia, there was, according to Rutledge, no dissent regarding 
charitable immunity. Liability for one's actions is the rule, immunity, the exception. Just 
as individuals are responsible for their own actions, and corporations are liable for their 
subordinates under respondeat superior, so should trustees of charities be accountable for 
the actions of their subordinates or agents. "Charity suffereth long and is kind, but in the 
common law it cannot be careless. When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes 
actionable wrongdoing."
51
  
More challenges to the doctrine occurred in various jurisdictions, as noted by 
Judge Rutledge, for a variety of reasons. The case of Noel v. Menninger (1954)  attacks 
and rejects charitable immunity on several levels, perhaps most importantly, on its 
constitutionality. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas stated: "Section 18 of our bill 
of rights reads: 'All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall 
11
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 have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.'"
52
 The court 
further noted that there was neither a constitutional nor statute driven exemption to 
charities for liability of the negligent or tortious acts of their agents. The court stated that 
if there ever was justification for charitable immunity, it no longer existed and any prior 
decision affirming charitable immunity was overruled.
53
    
The captain of the ship 
 Although the assault on charitable immunity had essentially begun in 1942, the 
doctrine remained a force to be reckoned with for many years thereafter. A new legal 
fiction appeared in Pennsylvania in the case of McConnell v. Williams (1949): the captain 
of the ship. This doctrine assigns liability to the physician for the acts of his assistants 
under his control but not directly employed by him.
54
  Looking at the genesis of the 
doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that the 
purpose of creating the fiction of the captain of the ship was "to do away with the 
traditional test of control and widen a doctor's vicarious liability"
55 
hence circumventing 
charitable immunity.                 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
  
 Patients injured by the negligence of low level hospital employees who had no 
resources to pay an adverse judgment deserved redress nonetheless. The courts turned to 
the operating surgeon "'who not only had the deepest pocket but often the only pocket 
from which the injured patient could recover.'"
56
  
The Schloendorff rule is reversed 
 The 1957 landmark case of Bing v.Thunig abandoned charitable immunity. Bing 
also reversed the Schloendorff rule regarding respondeat superior as elucidated by 
12
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 Justice Cardoza.
57
 As charitable immunity was being dismantled in various jurisdictions, 
the Bing court found no reason to continue to exempt hospitals—for profit or 
charitable—from respondeat superior. "The test should be . . . as it is for every other 
employer, was the person who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its 
employees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his employment."
58
 
 The assault on charitable immunity continued. By 1969 one of the few states still 
clinging to charitable immunity was Massachusetts, birthplace of the doctrine in this 
country. However, in its refusal to grant an appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court sent 
a very clear message regarding the future of the doctrine. The court noted that, on 
numerous previous occasions, it had "declined to renounce the defense of charitable 
immunity" reasoning that the change would be best handled through the legislature. 
However, with "only three or four states" recognizing the doctrine and no legislative 
activity on the horizon, "we take this occasion to give adequate warning that the next 
time we are squarely confronted by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity 
doctrine it is our intention to abolish it."
59
  
Down goes the captain of the ship  
By 2001, with the nearly universal repudiation of charitable immunity, the legal 
fiction of the captain of the ship had largely outlived its usefulness. In its decision in 
Lewis v. Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin (2001), the Supreme Court of the 
State of Wisconsin rejected a motion to accept the captain of the ship doctrine. The court 
stated that the purpose of captain of the ship was similar to that of respondeat superior, a 
theory that allowed a plaintiff to "invoke vicarious liability." However, it had never been 
13
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 adopted in Wisconsin and was being rejected in numerous other jurisdictions. 
"Because 'captain of the ship,' which enabled plaintiffs to recover in the face of a 
hospital's 'charitable immunity,' is an antiquated doctrine that fails to reflect the 
emergence of hospitals as modern health care facilities, we decline to adopt it now."
60
 
Deep pockets 
One hundred and thirty eight years have passed since McDonald v. Mass. General 
Hospital and charitable immunity was introduced. Hospitals were much different 
institutions then, in many ways little more than hotels where physicians could concentrate 
their patients. Many depended on charitable donations and trusts for their survival. 
Contrast that with the modern hospital, "called upon to assume the role of a 
comprehensive health-care center ultimately responsible for arranging and coordinating 
total health care."
61
  
In the era of charitable immunity, courts invented legal fictions such as the 
captain of the ship to find a "deep pocket" to recompense injured patients. As charitable 
immunity was eroded and hospitals were increasingly held to have any liability, liability 
insurance became necessary. As services expanded and hospitals became more 
businesses than recipients of charity, the courts moved away from holding the physician 
legally responsible for virtually any and every thing that went wrong.
62
    
Vestiges of charitable immunity remain in some jurisdictions, but overall, we 
have come fully 180 degrees from charitable immunity for hospitals with the current 
theory of liability, the Doctrine of Corporate Liability. This doctrine imposes the liability 
14
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 for negligence on the part of the hospital's agents on the hospitals.
63
 "The modern hospital 
is a viable 'deep pocket,' if not the 'deepest pocket,' for an injured patient."
64  
  
MALPRACTICE 
Why settle? 
From the defendant hospital’s point of view, in malpractice litigation there are 
two key factors to be considered: the first is the cost of mounting a defense and the 
second is exposure versus liability. (B. S. Johnson, RN, JD, personal communication, 
November 15, 2013) 
 In mounting a defense, the defendant hospital has to set aside a certain 
amount of resources. A short list of those resources might include the cost incurred by 
engaging outside legal counsel, obtaining depositions and the attendant costs such as 
reporters, reimbursement to staff for time spent prepping and making depositions, travel, 
and expert witnesses just to name a few. Resources must be available to cover these costs 
and, if the cost of defense approaches the cost of settlement, settlement may be more 
prudent than risking a jury verdict. This brings us to exposure versus liability. (B. S. 
Johnson, RN, JD, personal communication, November 15, 2013) 
 Recalling the case of Mr. Lowell, his anger was so great, he devoted much of his 
life to reviling his physicians in the press. The character of his unbridled vituperation is 
stunning, and resulted in Dr. Warren issuing a 142 page pamphlet in his own defense. 
The pamphlet was an open letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts and contained "a detailed case history. . .correspondence with Lowell and 
other physicians, physicians affidavits. . . ." and much more.
65 
15
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 Although the public exchange of the magnitude of the Lowell case would not be 
permitted in this day and age, negative publicity has the power to destroy, even if it is 
based on false allegation and innuendo. A closed settlement prevents the attendant 
negative publicity in the media and does not call for a public admission of wrongdoing. A 
likeable plaintiff who has suffered a bad outcome, even absent hard evidence of error or 
malpractice, has the potential to be a public relations nightmare. Liability may be low, 
but the uncertainty of a jury trial and the attendant  increase in exposure and potential for 
damage to the reputation of the institution may not be worth the risk, if a closed 
settlement can be brokered. (B. S. Johnson, RN, JD, personal communication, November 
15, 2013) 
 Another consideration of the Hospital Risk Manager in deciding to settle sooner 
rather than later, or for a slightly higher sum is the effect the litigation process has on the 
staff involved. Defending ones' self against allegations of negligence is a painful, stress 
inducing process. Even to staff who are not specifically named in a suit, the process of 
giving depositions is anxiety provoking and arduous at best. Getting staff out of the 
courtroom and focused back on the business of providing quality care to the sick and 
injured is sometimes worth the dollar outlay of a quick settlement. (B. S. Johnson, RN, 
JD, personal communication, May 1, 2014) 
 The type of settlement described above offers a little something to each side of a 
dispute, but there remains an inherent problem: the adversarial nature of medical error 
resolution is retained and reinforced. 
Who is to blame? 
16
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 Studies have shown that the vast majority of patients who are harmed in some 
way by medical malpractice or error never bring suit.
66 
It has also been observed that 
"physicians overestimate their risk of being sued. . . ."
67
  
Malpractice insurance cost for physicians is not determined by the number of 
claims against a physician, nor even his losses nor negative judgments. Rather, the cost is 
determined by the specialty of the physician and geographic location.
68
 
There is a bunker mentality with regard to the state of malpractice, malpractice 
insurance, and malpractice litigation in this country. That mentality is apparent in the 
verbiage used: it is never simply a problem, it is almost invariably referred to as a 
"crisis". The stakeholder discussions are characterized by finger pointing: physicians 
blaming lawyers, the tort system and frivolous lawsuits, and lawyers accusing physicians 
of sloppy care.
69
  
It is difficult to pin down the costs of medical malpractice, but the best estimate is 
about 2% of total healthcare dollars. The bottom line is this: stakeholders are in 
agreement "malpractice insurance has become less affordable and available."
70
 So is the 
problem with the doctors or with the lawyers? Or is it both? Neither? 
Consider this observation: "Now, many reflect back to view the 1990s not as a 
medical malpractice crisis, but rather as an insurance company accounting and 
investment crisis resulting in damage to the healthcare profession."
71
 
Through all the discussion of litigation, malpractice, insurance, crises, and 
blaming, focus on the important issue falls by the wayside:  what about the person who 
has been harmed? 
17
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 FROM PATERNALISM TO COMMUNICATION AND RESOLUTION  
 Forty years ago, well within the memory of the largest generation ever born, a 
curious patient asking the nurse what his blood pressure was would politely, but firmly, 
be told that was a matter he would have to bring up with his physician. Physicians 
routinely withheld the "real" diagnosis from any patient the doctor believed "couldn't 
handle it." Cancer patients in particular were lied to or mislead with assurances that they 
did not have cancer and that, "We got all of the tumor."  Patients signed surgical consents 
with little or no explanation, "Because Doc says this is what I need."  An unfunny bit of 
gallows humor from the era was "Doctors bury their mistakes."  
If a medical error was made or there was an adverse event, sitting down and 
having a frank discussion of what went wrong was unheard of, truly a heresy. Disclosure 
was virtually non-existent. Nurses who were witness to or strongly suspicious of an error 
by a physician or any other staff member would find themselves faced with an ethical 
dilemma. Nurses were told it was unethical to disclose what they knew, yet morally they 
knew it was unethical to deliberately conceal their knowledge from a sometimes 
bewildered patient or grieving family. To the extent that risk management existed in 
hospitals, the de facto philosophy of the time was investigate, improve, but do not 
disclose.  
A famous study by The Institute of Medicine concluded that 44,000 to 98,000 
deaths in the year 2000 in the United States were directly attributable to medical errors.
72 
 
Although disclosure of medical errors has not been universally embraced by Risk 
Managers, increasingly disclosure is becoming the norm, not an aberration. The basic 
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 reason is this: it is simply ethically and morally the right thing to do. B. S. Johnson, RN, 
JD (personal communication, May 1, 2014.) 
 The past ten years have seen incredible, once unheard of strides with regard to 
disclosure of medical errors in this country, yet the United States is lagging behind. 
Although the results are far from perfect, in England and Wales a model national policy 
was implemented titled "Being Open." The goal of the initiative is to ". . . develop and 
implement local initiatives to promote greater openness with patients their families when 
things go wrong and to provide required support."
73
 The Canadian Patient Safety Institute 
established Canadian Disclosure Guidelines in 2008. The Canadian Medical Protective 
Association (CMPA) developed a widely used booklet for practitioners titled 
Communicating With Your Patient About Harm: Disclosure of Adverse Events."
74 
In 2002 New Zealand established a legal "duty of candor" and all hospitals have 
written guidelines regarding "open disclosure."
75
 Along with the Scandinavian countries, 
New Zealand, in the 1970s, moved away from tort based litigation to offer financial 
compensation to all victims of personal injury. Funds are administered by The Accident 
Compensation Corporation. 
 And, as noted, progress is being made in the United States with increasing 
acceptance of the disclosure concept, renamed from disclosure and resolution to 
communication and resolution by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality.
76
 And, although there is not a lot of hard data or experience working with the 
model, early indications are that the Disclosure, Apology, and Offer (DA&O) model 
demonstrates promise in shifting the paradigm from concealment of errors, anger, blame 
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 placing, and litigation to open and direct communication regarding error, and apology 
and offer of compensation to resolution.
77
 
There are, of course, legal complications having to do with disclosure, privacy, 
and liability,
78,79
 complications far beyond the scope of this paper. However, there is 
good news for physicians in the change from paternalism to disclosure. The legal 
complications alluded to above are not insurmountable, they can be worked out. 
Programs like DA&O have the potential to decrease errors, improve the quality of care, 
and, if not end, at least decrease the scapegoating of physicians that has existed since at 
least the reign of The Law Giver, King Hammurabi.  
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